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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and 
Secretaries of State to the country on civil conflict. To achieve our objective, we compile 
novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2017 derived from the 
historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we 
introduce novel instrumental variables for the number of official visits variables, namely 
aviation safety and capital distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by 
U.S. officials to the country have a statistically significant positive effect on the onset of 
conflict. This indicates that the visits by U.S. officials induce the insurgents to engage in 
armed conflict with the incumbent government that is perceived as a stooge of the United 
States. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and 
Secretaries of State to a country on the onset of conflict. In other words, we investigate 
whether the visits of U.S. officials instigate civil conflict in a country. This is the first attempt 
in the literature to consider the number of visits by U.S. Officials as a determinant of conflict. 
The intuition of this paper is straightforward. The visits of U.S. officials are usually 
taken as a signal of moral support that the U.S. administration is giving to the country’s 
governing regime against the insurgents, as a way of using the power of the United States to 
convince the international community of the legitimacy of the regime’s cause against its 
adversaries, and as a chance for the regime to appeal for military support from the United 
States in terms of armaments procurement and training. Thus, we would expect that the visits 
by U.S. officials may act as a deterrent for the opposition as they signal the strength of a 
government that they will not be able to overthrow through an armed conflict.  
On the other hand, welcoming a U.S. President or a Secretary of state can instigate 
conflict if it signals to the dissenters that their government is a stooge that only serves the 
strategic interests of the United States on the expense of the entire populace, or if the 
opposition is ideologically opposed to the United States and is willing to engage in conflict 
with governments friendly to the U.S. Thus, we should expect that the number of visits by 
U.S. officials to act as catalyst for conflict. 
Given that the effect of the number of visits of U.S. officials to the country on conflict is 
inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper uses 
novel variables that indicate the number of visits by U.S. Presidents or Secretaries of state to 
the country. These variables are derived from the archives of the U.S. Department of State. 
The paper examines the effect of these variables on the onset of conflict. However, the key 
difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the visits of 
U.S. officials can affect the likelihood of conflict, it is also possible that the occurrence of 
conflict in a country can entice U.S. officials to visit the country either to lend their 
diplomatic support for the government, to conclude agreements on weapon procurement or 
military training with the friendly government, to mediate between the dissident factions and 
the government, or to broker a peace accord between the parties embroiled in conflict.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use novel instrumental variables. For the number 
of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state, we use aviation safety and capital 
distance as instruments. The first instrument captures the number of aircraft accidents in the 
country, as U.S. officials are more likely to visit countries with a higher level of aviation 
safety. The second instrument captures the distance between Washington D.C. and the 
location of the Presidential residence of a country, as U.S. officials are more likely to visit 
countries that are closer to their capital.  
The Two Stage Least Squares estimations show that the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents, the number of visits of Secretaries of state, and the total number of visits of both 
U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State have a statistically significant positive effect on the 
onset of conflict. The results are robust even after the inclusion of control variables and after 
using alternative samples. The Poisson regression estimation with endogenous regressors also 
confirms these findings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures 
are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of conflict. Studies in the 
literature focus on the effect of factors such as climate variability, abundance of natural 
wealth, diversity, and democratic governance. 
There are several studies that attempt to examine the effect of climate change on 
conflict. Burke et al. (2015) find that deviations from temperature and precipitation patterns 
systematically increase the likelihood of conflict, including assault, Killings, demonstrations 
and civil war. Burke et al. (2013) show that deviations from precipitation and temperature 
patterns systematically increase the perilous prospect of human conflict, violence and crime, 
and political instability. Hsiang et al. (2011) argue that planetary-scale climate changes are 
associated with conflict. The authors also show that the probability of conflict throughout the 
tropics doubles during El Niño years relative to La Niña years. Miguel et al. (2004) find that 
lower growth, driven by declines in rainfall, is strongly negatively associated with the 
likelihood of conflict. In a subsequent article, Miguel and Satyanath (2011) reconfirm their 
results finding that adverse economic growth shocks, driven by declines in rainfall, increases 
the likelihood of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Iyigun et al. (2017) investigate the effects of 
cooling on conflict in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East from 1400 C.E.-1900 C.E. The 
authors show that cooling is associated with increased conflict, and that their estimates are 
strongest in areas that are suitable for the production of staples.  
Other studies found no clear association between climate change and conflict. For 
instance, Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) find that rainfall, temperature and drought have no 
significant effect on conflict, and that countries that are more ethnically fractionalized and are 
less democratic, are more prone to conflict when hit by a drought than others. Ciccone (2011) 
argues that as rainfall shocks are transitory, low rainfall growth may reflect negative shocks or 
mean reversion following positive shocks. The author shows that lower rainfall levels and 
negative rainfall shocks do not increase the onset and incidence of conflict in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In another article, Ciccone (2013) finds that positive rainfall shocks have positive but 
transitory effect on income. Using rainfall shocks as an instrument for transitory income 
shocks, the author concludes that negative transitory income shocks reduce the risk of 
conflict. 
There are other studies that examine the effect of natural resource abundance and 
dependence on conflict. Rohner et al. (2017) find a positive effect of mining on conflict at the 
local level, that an increase in mineral prices increases the probability of conflict in producing 
areas, and that countries with less corrupt institutions, and with lower religious 
fractionalization or polarization, are less affected by mining-induced conflict. Rohner et al. 
(2015) find that country pairs where only one country has oil near the border are more likely 
to engage in conflict than country pairs with no oil, or where the oil is very far from the 
border, or when both countries have oil near the border. Rohner and Morelli (2015) compute 
an indicator of the unevenness of oil field distribution across ethnic groups, an Oil Gini 
coefficient. The authors find that this variable has a positive association with conflict, and that 
conflict is more likely to occur when the group out of power has an ethnic homeland that is 
abundant in oil. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) find that the ratio of primary exports to 
Gross Domestic Product does not have a statistically significant effect on conflict, but that 
conflict increases dependence on resource extraction.  
Lei and Michaels (2014) find that giant oilfield discoveries increase the incidence of 
internal armed conflict especially in countries that had experienced armed conflicts or coups 
in the decade prior to discovery. Tsui and Cotet (2013) find that the association between oil 
wealth and the onset of civil war onset disappears once country-specific factors are controlled 
for, that oil wealth is uncorrelated with coup attempts, and that oil wealth is significantly 
correlated with defense spending in nondemocratic countries.  
Some studies examine the effect of diversity on conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
find that higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a significant determinant of the duration 
and the likelihood of civil wars. The authors also find that the is non-monotonic such that 
highly heterogeneous societies are no more prone to war than highly homogeneous ones. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that ethnic fractionalization is weekly significant while 
religious fractionalization is insignificant in predicting the outbreak of civil war. Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) find that countries with high ethnic and religious fractionalization have been no 
more likely to experience civil violence. Fearon et al. (2007) examine whether countries face 
a higher likelihood of civil war when the state is controlled by an ethnic minority. The authors 
find that there is a weak and statistically insignificant tendency for states with ethnic minority 
leaders to have a higher likelihood of civil war. 
Desmet et al. (2017) find that ethnic fractionalization has no predictive power on 
conflict, and that ethnic divisions matter for conflict and public goods when they are 
associated with cultural differences across ethnic groups. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2010) 
show that ethnically polarized countries have to struggle with longer civil wars. Reynal-
Querol (2002) shows that religious polarization is more important as a social cleavage that 
can develop into civil war than linguistic polarization.  
Some studies examine the effect of democratic governance on the likelihood of conflict. 
For instance, Sunde and Cervellati (2014) find that democratization has an adverse effect on 
the incidence and the onset of conflict over the control of the government. The authors also 
find that peaceful transitions to democracy are more likely to decrease the occurrence of 
conflict and coups, unlike violent transitions ones. Collier and Rohner (2008) show that 
democracy makes rich countries safer whereas in rich countries, but increases proneness to 
political violence below an income threshold. Hegre (2014) find that pairs of democratic 
states have a lower risk of interstate conflict than other pairs, and hat consolidated 
democracies have less conflict than semi-democracies. 
Our paper’s contribution is that it is the first attempt to examine the effects of the 
number of visits by U.S. officials on conflict. This complements our work on the effect of 
leader’s trips on foreign investment in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020a), on foreign debt in 
Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020b), on democracy in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020c), and 
on foreign aid in Kodila-Tedika and Khalifa (2020d). 
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is an indicator of civil conflict derived from 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, covering the 1960–2017. In this dataset, an armed 
conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”  We follow Arbatli et al. 
(forthcoming) in defining conflict as “an internal armed conflict between the government of a 
state and one or more internal opposition group(s), without any interference from other states 
as independent actors or intervention from other states to support either side of the conflict.” 
The conflict variable used is the log number of new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets per year 
during the 1960–2017 time period. The detailed description of the variables is included in 
Arbatli et al. (forthcoming). 
The variables of interest are the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
state to the country, during the period 1960-2017. This data is derived from the Office of the 
Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of Sate of the United States of America.1 
Figures 1 and 2 show world maps of the number of visits of U.S. Presidents to each country, 
and the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of state to each country, respectively.  
We include some control variables that are identified by the literature as critical 
determinants of conflict. The first is the ethnic fractionalization indicator derived from 
Alesina et al. (2003). Fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected 
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 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory. 
individuals from a country are from different ethnic groups. We also include the average level 
of the Terrain Ruggedness Index of Nunn and Puga (2012). We use the fraction of years under 
democracy, defined as the fraction of years during the 1960–2017 time period that a country 
spent as a democracy and as an autocracy, respectively. We include oil or gas discovery 
reserve which is a time-invariant dummy for the presence of at least one petroleum (oil or 
gas) reserve. This variable is derived from Arbatli et al. (forthcoming). We also include a  
dummy  variable  indicating  if  the  land is  a  “small  island”  or  a  “very  small island” as 
reported in the World Countries geographical dataset. Finally, we include the level of 
development measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) which is derived from the World Development Indicators.  
4. Estimation  
4.1. OLS Results 
We conduct an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of official visits by U.S. 
Presidents and Secretaries of state to the country on the onset of conflict during the period 
1960-2017. To explore this relationship we use the following equation 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (1) 
Conflicti is our measure of civil conflict in country i. OfficialVisitsi is the number of 
visits by U.S. Presidents or Secretaries of state to country i. ℵi is a vector of control variables 
and μi is the error term. The vector of control variables includes those commonly identified in 
the literature as determinants of conflict. Thus, we control for the logarithm of GDP per capita 
as the country’s level of economic development is likely to determine the likelihood of 
conflict. Countries that enjoy higher living standards are less likely to engage in conflict that 
will cause deterioration in living conditions. We also control for ethnic fractionalization, the 
fraction of years under democracy and an indicator of oil and gas discoveries. In our literature 
review, we have identified several studies that concluded that diversity, democratic 
governance and the abundance of natural wealth are factors that can determine the likelihood 
of conflict. The study is a cross-country analysis and applies the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation technique since our variable of interest is only available in cross-section.  
The results are shown in table 2. Columns 1-4 show the OLS and 2SLS estimation 
results when our variable of interest is the number of visits of U.S. presidents. Columns 5-8 
show the OLS and 2SLS estimation results when our variable of interest is the number of 
visits of Secretaries of state.  
The Ordinary Least Squares estimations show that neither the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents nor the visits of U.S. Secretaries of state has a significant effect on conflict. This is 
the case even after the inclusion of the control variables. The OLS results also show that the 
only significant conflict predictors are the logarithm of GDP per capita and the dummy for oil 
and gas discovery. 
4.2. 2SLS Results 
The OLS estimation assumes that the official visits are exogenous to conflict. However, 
the problem of endogeneity cannot be ignored. First, the association may be spurious due to 
the failure to account for an unobserved factor which is affecting both the onset of conflict 
and official visits. Second, as much as the visits of U.S. officials can affect the likelihood of 
conflict, it is also possible that the occurrence of conflict in a country can entice U.S. officials 
to visit the country either to lend their support for the government or to mediate between the 
parties engaged in conflict. 
To deal with potential endogeneity, we need a source of exogenous variation in the 
number of official visits by using an instrumental variable approach. We propose two 
instrumental variables in our analysis. The first is aviation safety which is the number of 
aircraft accidents that occurred in the country from 1960 to 2017. We collected the raw data2 
                                                          
2
 https://aviation-safety.net/database/country/. 
and aggregated the data for each country. We use another instrument called capital distance, 
which is the distance in km from Washington D.C. to the official place of presidential 
residence in every country around the world. We use the site https://www.movable-
type.co.uk/scripts/latlong.html for the distance calculations. For reasons of robustness or 
reliability, we use others site to check the conformity of the calculated distance. These 
include: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gccalc.shtml, and https://gps-coordinates.org/distance-
between-coordinates.php. 
This identification strategy is based on the intuition that U.S. Presidents and Secretaries 
of state are more likely to visit countries if the trip is sufficiently safe to undertake, and are 
more likely to visit countries whose capital cities are closer to that of the United States, which 
is their place of residence. In this context, the first stage of the Two Stage Least Squares 
estimation is described as follows 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 + 𝑒𝑖 (2) 
Where Distancei is the distance between the presidential residence in country i and 
Washington D.C.,while Safetyi is the aviation safety record in country i. Table 2 shows the 
effect of official visits on conflict, corrected for endogeneity using the instrumental variables. 
The 2SLS show that the number of visits of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of state has a 
statistically significant positive effect on conflict.  
Table 3 includes the results considering the summation of the number of visits of U.S. 
Presidents and Secretaries of state. The first stage of the estimation suggests that the aviation 
safety instrument is valid, while the capital distance instrument seems to be insignificant. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS results, while columns 3 and 4 show the 2SLS results. The 
OLS results show that the coefficient of the total visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
state is insignificant. However, the 2SLS results show that the total visits variable has a 
statistically significant positive effect.  
Table 4 includes the 2SLS results of a sample of Developing countries only. Column 1 
includes the effect of the number of visits of U.S. Presidents. Column 2 includes the effect of 
the number of visits of U.S. Secretaries of State. Column 3 includes the effect of the total 
number of visits of both U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State. The results show that all the 
official visits variables has a statistically significant positive coefficient. 
These results imply that these visits of U.S. officials reaffirm the view held by the 
opposition or by rebels that the incumbent government is a puppet of the United States. This 
justifies their decision to engage in armed conflict with the regime. 
4.3. Poisson Regression 
We also conduct a Poisson regression which assumes the conflict variable has a 
Poisson distribution, and assumes the logarithm of its expected value can be modeled by a 
linear combination of unknown parameters. A Poisson regression model is sometimes known 
as a log-linear model. The estimation equation is as follows 
log⁡(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖|𝑋𝑖) = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
Where Xi is a vector of independent variables which include the number of visits by 
U.S. officials. In table 5, we start with a Negative binomial regression which is a 
generalization of the Poisson regression as it loosens the highly restrictive assumption of the 
Poisson model that the variance is equal to the mean. Columns 1-3 of table 5 include the 
results of the Negative binomial regression which show that the three visits variables have 
insignificant coefficients. 
To address the issue of endoegeneity, we estimate a Poisson regression with 
endogenous regressors, which estimates the parameters of a Poisson regression model in 
which some of the regressors are endogenous. The results in columns 4-6 in table 5 show that 
the three visits variables, instrumented by safety aviation and capital distance, have 
statistically significant positive coefficients. This confirms our previous findings. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect on conflict of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents 
and Secretaries of State to the country. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce 
novel instrumental variables for the three official visits variables, namely aviation safety, and 
capital distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by the U.S. officials to 
the country have a statistically significant positive effect on the onset of conflict. This 
indicates that these visits of U.S. officials induce the opposition to engage in armed conflict 
with an incumbent government that is perceived as a stooge of the United States. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capital Distance 191   8899.076   3743.188   0 16360 
Visits of U.S. President 195   3.112821   6.149142   0 38 
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State 157   16.36943   26.63266   0 153 
Aviation Safety 181   21.1989   40.49025   0 392 
GDP per capita  150   7.698125   1.476714   5.100214   10.63008 
Democracy  149   .3921772   .3776692   0   1 
Africa  168 .2797619   .4502241   0   1 
North Americas  168 .083871   .2780927   0   1 
Asia  168 .2559524   .4376998   0   1 
Europa  168 .2261905   .4196146   0   1 
Oceania  168 .0654762   .2481037   0   1 
South Americas  168 .0774194   .268122   0   1 
Visits of U.S. Secretary of State + Visits of U.S. President 134   22.5   33.90605   0   184 
Island  155   .0516129   .2219614   0   1 
Ethnic fractionalization 154   .4683199   .2561933   .001998   .930175 
Oil or gas reserve discovery 151   .6688742   .4721843   0 1 
Number of new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets per year 155   .0223534   .0312124   0   .1896552 
Total count of new PRIO25 civil conflict onsets 150   1.14   1.6013   0   11 
Ruggedness 155   126.3238   124.5955   3.605   747.207 
       
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Number of U.S. Official’s Visits and Onset of Civil Conflict 1960-2017 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Visits of U.S. Presidents -0.007 0.029 0.158* 0.178** 
    
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.090) (0.086) 
    
Visits of U.S. Secretaries 
of State     0.003 0.010** 0.072** 0.071*** 
     
(0.004) (0.004) (0.035) (0.026) 
Ruggedness 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Island nation dummy 
 
-0.455 -0.486 -0.747 
 
-0.166 0.337 0.453 
  
(0.362) (0.457) (0.628) 
 
(0.327) (0.548) (0.647) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
0.145 0.672 0.918 
 
0.340 1.271 1.497 
  
(0.437) (0.635) (0.682) 
 
(0.487) (0.869) (0.967) 
Log GDP per capita, 
1960--2017 average  
-
0.531*** 
-
0.755*** -0.817***  -0.555*** 
-
0.932*** -1.024*** 
  
(0.117) (0.247) (0.248) 
 
(0.131) (0.322) (0.337) 
Oil or gas reserve 
discovery  1.036*** 0.808** 0.673*  0.918*** 0.342 0.202 
  
(0.265) (0.325) (0.390) 
 
(0.287) (0.520) (0.550) 
Fraction of years under 
democracy, 1960--2017   0.030 0.348   0.213 -0.104 
   
(0.678) (0.884) 
  
(0.850) (1.138) 
Continental dummy No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Cons 1.176*** 4.477*** 5.569*** 6.409*** 1.082*** 4.665*** 6.302*** 7.917*** 
 
(0.138) (0.980) (1.583) (1.987) (0.151) (1.134) (2.158) (2.739) 
Number of observations 149 149 143 143 130 130 128 128 
R2 0.001 0.235 0.010 -0.023 0.003 0.247 -0.691 -0.618 
Hansen J statistic (p-
value)   0.3960   0.1572   0.8728 0.134 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic)   23.390 26.410   4.628 7.416 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic   12.363 11.934   5.004   5.870 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; 
.1 - *; 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Total U.S. Official’s Visits and Onset of Civil Conflict 1960-2017 
 
OLS 2SLS 
 
I II III IV 
Visits of U.S. Secretaries of State + Visits of 
U.S. Presidents 0.002 0.009** 0.050* 0.052** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.021) 
Ruggedness 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Island nation dummy 
 
-0.182 0.152 0.217 
  
(0.328) (0.483) (0.609) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
0.356 1.170 1.430 
  
(0.484) (0.791) (0.893) 
Log GDP per capita 
 
-0.559*** -0.884*** -0.980*** 
  
(0.132) (0.304) (0.321) 
Oil or gas reserve discovery 
 
0.923*** 0.480 0.302 
  
(0.286) (0.463) (0.524) 
Fraction of years under democracy 
  
0.180 -0.002 
   
(0.800) (1.068) 
Continental dummy No No No Yes 
Cons 1.097*** 4.675*** 6.094*** 7.555*** 
 
(0.153) (1.138) (1.982) (2.562) 
Number of observations 130 130 128 128 
R2 0,001 0,246 -0,342 -0,388 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 
  
0.9411  0.9456 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
 
7.178 10.209 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
  
5.851  6.407 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 2SLS with a sample of Developing countries only. 
 
I II III 
Visits of U.S. Presidents 0.343*** 
  
 
(0.069) 
  
Visits of the U.S. Secretaries of State 
 
0.077*** 
 
  
(0.026) 
 
Visits of U.S. Secretaries of State + Visits of U.S. 
Presidents   0.068*** 
   
(0.018) 
Ruggedness -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Island nation dummy -0.764 0.561 0.433 
 
(0.877) (0.671) (0.721) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.788 1.532 1.540 
 
(0.728) (1.093) (1.070) 
Log GDP per capita -0.642*** -0.847*** -0.824*** 
 
(0.202) (0.326) (0.318) 
Oil or gas reserve discovery 1.044** 0.791 0.809 
 
(0.428) (0.584) (0.575) 
Fraction of years under democracy 0.534 0.412 0.414 
 
(0.854) (1.383) (1.316) 
Continental dummy 0.165 -0.288 -0.305 
_cons 4.253*** 5.531** 5.372** 
 
(1.302) (2.298) (2.217) 
Number of observations 115 100 100 
R2 0,185 -0,236 -0,166 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 2.683 4.355 4.204 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)  44.535 7.784  9.950 
Sargan statistic  (p-value) 0.6320 0.0439  0.1020 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
   
 
Table 5. Official Visits and the Onset of Civil Conflict 
 
Negative binomial regression/ 
Poisson regression 
Poisson regression with endogenous regressors - Control function 
estimator for multiplicative model 
 
I II III IV V IX 
 
   
Sd stage First-stage Sd stage First-stage Sed stage First-stage 
Visits of U.S. Presidents 0.017 
  
0.072** 
     
 
(0.019) 
  
(0.034) 
     
Visits of U.S.Secretaries of State 
 
0.006* 
   
0.054** 
   
  
(0.003) 
   
(0.024) 
   
Visits of U.S.Secretaries of State +  Travel 
Visits of U.S. Presidents   0.005     0.032***  
   
(0.003) 
    
(0.011) 
 
Ruggedness -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.020) 
Island nation dummy -0.718 -0.232 -0.249 -1.062 0.257 -0.276 -10.617* -0.563 -10.541* 
 
(0.478) (0.492) (0.491) (0.714) (1.511) (0.907) (5.644) (0.867) (6.346) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.295 0.395 0.396 0.827 -5.931*** 1.907* -20.435 1.596* -26.968* 
 
(0.358) (0.395) (0.395) (0.669) (2.141) (1.054) (12.704) (0.890) (14.540) 
Log GDP per capita -0.562*** -0.605*** -0.604*** -0.799*** 1.377*** -1.134*** 6.217*** -1.029*** 7.682*** 
 
(0.115) (0.129) (0.130) (0.168) (0.381) (0.294) (1.888) (0.238) (2.184) 
Oil or gas reserve discovery 1.076*** 1.182*** 1.181*** 0.717** 1.095 0.241 8.474* 0.436 9.621* 
 
(0.215) (0.253) (0.253) (0.347) (0.991) (0.534) (4.345) (0.456) (5.210) 
Fraction of years under democracy 0.287 0.285 0.281 -0.721 2.456 -1.674* 13.203 -1.366** 15.676 
 
(0.581) (0.606) (0.607) (0.497) (1.710) (0.859) (9.955) (0.632) (11.086) 
Continental dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Capital Distance 
    
-0.010 
 
0.066 
 
0.055 
     
(0.008) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.076) 
Aviation Safety 
    
0.076*** 
 
0.195*** 
 
0.272*** 
     
(0.022) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.067) 
Cons -1.214 -1.155 -1.156 -0.380 -11.775*** 1.978 -58.299*** 1.136 -70.685*** 
 
(0.950) (1.057) (1.066) (1.331) (3.189) (2.260) (20.203) (1.754) (21.933) 
Number of observations 148 130 130 143 128 128 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
         
 
 
Figure 1. World Map of the number of Visits of U.S. Presidents 
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Figure 2. World Map of the number of Visits of U.S. Secretaries of State 
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Figure 3. Relationship between Official Visits and Civil Conflits 
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